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I. INTRODUCTION 
We are about to observe the fortieth anniversary of the publication of a 
seminal law review article: State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights by Associate Justice William J. Brennan.1 This Article was 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. J.D., The 
University of Chicago; B.A., Grinnell College. Research assistant, The Sixth Illinois 
Constitutional Convention in 1970. The author thanks the research staff of the Louis L. 
Biro Law Library, The John Marshall Law School, and especially Victor M. Salas, for 
invaluable assistance. 
 1 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489, 491 (1977) (arguing for the reappraisal of the strategy to rest 
claims involving assertions of individual rights on state constitutional grounds, as state 
constitutions may offer protections beyond those offered under the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of federal law).  
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also the basis of a talk Justice Brennan later gave at The New York University 
Law School.2 It is often said that this article, one of the most-cited in 
American legal scholarship,3 sparked the “new judicial federalism.”4 
In 1986, I wrote in a tribute to Justice Brennan: “This one law review 
article, almost by itself, created the renaissance of state constitutionalism.”5 I 
have not really changed my view since then. Yet, what has been the impact of 
Justice Brennan’s article in practice? Have the state courts simply paid lip 
service to “individual rights” in state constitutions, giving them a modicum of 
respect while quietly continuing to give supremacy to the rights in the U.S. 
Constitution? Have the state courts created a robust jurisprudence that 
advances the powers of the states in the federal system? In this Article, I shall 
attempt to answer those questions. 
This Article proceeds by answering those questions through four related 
issues. Part II explores the effect of the Michigan v. Long doctrine over the 
past thirty-plus years since the originating decision. Part III examines the three 
different approaches taken by state supreme courts in interpreting state 
constitutions alongside their federal counterpart: lockstepping, limited 
lockstepping, and independent jurisprudence. Part IV looks at approaches to 
interpretation where a provision in a state constitution has no analogue in the 
federal document. Part V asks whether there should be national uniformity in 
individual rights and, if not, when states should be permitted to deviate from 
that norm. Through this analysis, the Article evaluates the real-world impact of 
Brennan’s seminal article. 
II. THE EFFECT OF THE MICHIGAN V. LONG DOCTRINE 
In 1983, in a seminal case, the United States Supreme Court took a 
significant step in determining the relationship between state constitutional 
rights and the Federal Bill of Rights. The Court’s decision endorsed Brennan’s 
view that individual rights should be viewed independently under state 
constitutional grounds. However, it is unclear how much of an impact the 
decision has actually made in practice. 
                                                                                                                     
 2 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) (reprinting 
Justice Brennan’s talk). 
 3 The article ranked twenty-sixth in the list of most-cited law review articles in Fred 
R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 768 
(1996). See also, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the 
New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93 (2000); Robert F. Williams, 
Foreword, Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. 
REV. xiii (1996). 
 4 Friedman, supra note 3, at 93–94. 
 5 Ann Lousin, Justice Brennan: A Tribute to a Federal Judge Who Believes in State’s 
Rights, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 2 (1986). 
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The case was Michigan v. Long.6 The case began in the Michigan 
Supreme Court, which decided a search and seizure case in favor of the 
accused on both state and federal constitutional grounds.7 In that opinion, the 
Michigan Supreme Court conflated its discussion of both the federal and state 
claims.8 In reviewing that opinion, Justice O’Connor, speaking for the United 
States Supreme Court, refused to consider the federal claim because the 
Michigan Supreme Court had not made it clear that the state constitutional 
decision relied upon an “adequate and independent state ground.”9  
Justice O’Connor said that the Michigan court had not “ma[d]e clear by a 
plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used 
only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that 
the court has reached.”10 Presumably, Justice O’Connor’s purpose was to 
compel state courts to make it clear that they had exhausted all state 
constitutional claims before ruling on the federal claims.11 In fact, by this time, 
it had become quite common for state supreme courts to pay only lip service to 
state constitutional claims. As one lawyer who clerked for a state supreme 
court in the 1970s told me, state court opinions would mention both the federal 
and state constitutional provisions, analyze the federal cases, and then simply 
state that the analysis and result would be the same under the state 
constitution. In effect, he said, the opinion would “boilerplate” an adequate 
and independent state ground.12 
Of course, by 1983, federal judges were aware of this trend.13 However, 
because there was no robust jurisprudence concerning the state constitutional 
claims, few observers, much less judges, cared. If the search and seizure was 
                                                                                                                     
 6 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
 7 Id. at 1033–34. 
 8 See Charles G. Douglas, III, Federalism and State Constitutions, 13 VT. L. REV. 
127, 136 (1988) (“The significance of Long is that it requires state judges to stand up and 
be counted. No longer can they be lazy and use the United States Supreme Court as an 
excuse to avoid thought and analysis about issues the drafters of the Bill of Rights never 
even considered . . . .”).  
 9 Long, 463 U.S. at 1042–43. 
 10 Id. at 1041. 
 11 The Long Court adopted the plain statement rule to demonstrate “respect for state 
courts, and . . . to avoid advisory opinions.” Id. at 1040. By establishing the plain statement 
rule, the Supreme Court hoped to encourage state judges to develop an independent body 
of state constitutional law. See id. at 1041; see also Larry M. Elison & Dennis 
NettikSimmons, Federalism and State Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent 
and Adequate State Grounds, 45 MONT. L. REV. 177, 195–200 (1984) (providing an 
explanation and critique of Michigan v. Long). 
 12 See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 84 
(2006) (“[T]he New Hampshire high court has customarily added boilerplate language to 
its constitutional decisions specifying that it reaches the state constitution first and cites 
federal precedent, if at all, merely for its persuasive power.”); Fred L. Morrison, An 
Introduction to the Minnesota Constitution, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 287, 304 (1994). 
 13 During the 1980s, several federal judges told me this privately. 
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to be held valid under either claim, what difference did it make if the state and 
federal courts decided under one constitution or the other?  
For their part, it is not clear if state supreme courts have truly established 
the practice of considering all state claims before proceeding to consider 
federal claims. Each state seems to have marched to its own drummer. This 
has sometimes resulted in confusion, with state and federal claims bouncing up 
and down in the courts. Two examples are the Indiana voter identification 
cases14 and the Illinois “dog sniff” cases.15 
Indiana enacted a voter identification statute that required presentation of 
an approved identification card at the polls before a voter could take a ballot.16 
The challenge, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, began in federal 
court on federal grounds.17 The United States Supreme Court ultimately 
decided that the Indiana statute did not violate federal constitutional 
standards.18 That should have been the end of the litigation. However, the 
League of Women Voters of Indiana then brought a separate action purely on 
state constitutional grounds in state court.19 In League of Women Voters of 
Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita, the Court of Appeals of Indiana held that the voter 
identification statute violated the Indiana Constitution.20 On appeal, the 
Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute comported with the 
state constitution’s standards,21 apparently because those standards merely 
reflected the federal standards. 
What would have happened if the Indiana Supreme Court had affirmed the 
Indiana Court of Appeals? Doing so may very well have rendered the United 
States Supreme Court’s opinion in Crawford moot. In effect, the United States 
Supreme Court would have wasted its time as far as the Indiana statute was 
concerned. At best, one could have said that Crawford still had the effect of 
establishing that a voter identification law like Indiana’s would pass federal 
muster in the United States Supreme Court. In short, that, at least, could have 
given some guidance to other states. 
The Illinois “dog sniff” cases are more complex.22 They began when an 
Illinois state police officer stopped Roy Caballes for speeding on I-80, a 
highway in Illinois.23 The officer radioed for a colleague with a drug sniffing 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); League of Women 
Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 915 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), vacated, 929 N.E.2d 
758 (Ind. 2010). 
 15 See People v. Caballes (Caballes I), 802 N.E.2d 202 (Ill. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 
405 (2005), remanded to 851 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 2006). 
 16 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 185–86. 
 17 Id. at 186–89. 
 18 Id. at 204. 
 19 League of Women Voters, 915 N.E.2d at 154.  
 20 Id. at 168. 
 21 League of Women Voters, 929 N.E.2d at 772. 
 22 See Caballes I, 802 N.E.2d 202 (Ill. 2003), vacated, 543 U.S. 405 (2005), 
remanded to 851 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 2006). 
 23 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406 (2005). 
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dog.24 When the dog indicated that there were drugs in the car, the police 
searched the car, finding marijuana.25 The challenge to the search and seizure 
originated in state court.26 The trial court judge upheld the validity of the 
search and seizure.27 So did the Illinois Appellate Court.28  
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, Caballes’s lawyer raised both the 
Fourth Amendment and the search and seizure provision of the Illinois 
Constitution, Article I, Section 6.29 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the 
holding that the search and seizure was valid by a vote of 5–3.30 Neither the 
majority nor the minority referred to the state constitutional claim.31 
Unsurprisingly, Caballes appealed in federal court.32 In Illinois v. Caballes, 
the United States Supreme Court held, 6–2, that the search was valid under the 
Fourth Amendment, thus reversing the Illinois Supreme Court on the federal 
claim.33 It remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court “for further 
proceedings not inconsistent” with its opinion.34 
The remand put the Illinois Supreme Court into a quandary. The federal 
issue having been decided, the only remaining issue was the Illinois state 
constitutional claim—which the court had failed to specifically address when 
the case first arrived at its docket three years previously.35 The court decided: 
(1) that it would follow the lockstep doctrine; (2) that it would hold that the 
state search and seizure provision, despite being cast in different language 
from the Fourth Amendment, was not broader than the federal provision; and 
(3) that the specific “right to privacy” in the Illinois Constitution was not 
implicated in a car search.36 
Frankly, the history of the litigation is incredibly messy. If the Illinois 
Supreme Court had fully determined whether the dog sniff was a valid 
“search” under Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution before it 
considered the Federal Fourth Amendment claims, we would have a much 
clearer picture of the relationship between federal and Illinois standards.37 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. 
 26 See id. at 407. 
 27 Id.; see People v. Caballes, No. 98-CF-447, 1999 WL 34774109 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 
22, 1999). 
 28 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407; see People v. Caballes, 797 N.E.2d 250 (table) (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2003). 
 29 See generally Defendant’s Petition for Leave to Appeal at 6, Caballes I, 802 N.E.2d 
202 (Ill. 2003) (No. 91547), 2001 WL 34387793, at *6. 
 30 See Caballes I, 802 N.E.2d at 205. 
 31 See generally id. 
 32 See Caballes, 543 U.S. 405. 
 33 Id. at 410. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Caballes I, 802 N.E.2d 202; see supra text accompanying note 31. 
 36 People v. Caballes (Caballes II), 851 N.E.2d 26, 45–46 (Ill. 2006). 
 37 See generally John Christopher Anderson, The Mysterious Lockstep Doctrine and 
the Future of Judicial Federalism in Illinois, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 965 (2013) (discussing 
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This failure-to-consider phenomenon occurred more recently in Kansas as 
well.38 The United States Supreme Court reviewed an Eighth Amendment 
Claim under the U.S. Constitution when the Kansas Supreme Court had never 
first exhausted the state constitutional issue.39 
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court could obviate the danger of 
further litigation like Crawford and Caballes by absolutely requiring the states 
to adjudicate state claims before federal litigation ensues. For example, it 
could require the Chief Justice of the state supreme court to issue a certificate 
that all state claims have been fully considered; without that certificate, the 
federal courts could then refuse to hear the federal claims. This would further 
promote Brennan’s thesis by forcing more careful consideration of the state 
constitutional claims. Even if a state did this, however, the manner in which 
each state interprets state constitutional claims will illustrate the actual impact 
of Brennan’s article in practice. 
III. THE EFFECT OF THE THREE SEPARATE APPROACHES TAKEN BY STATE 
SUPREME COURTS INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS ALONGSIDE 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
In the last four decades, roughly since the appearance of Justice Brennan’s 
article, state supreme courts have taken one of three approaches to determining 
the relationship between state constitutional rights and federal constitutional 
rights: the lockstep approach, the limited lockstep approach, and the 
independent jurisprudence approach. 
The first approach is the lockstep approach. Under this approach, the state 
judges its state constitutional provisions in accordance with the jurisprudence 
interpreting the corresponding or comparable federal provisions.40 It is not 
entirely clear which states follow the lockstep approach all of the time, some 
of the time, or just occasionally.41 The Florida Constitution actually mandates 
                                                                                                                     
the trend of some state courts to largely reject the call for judicial federalism and instead 
engage in a “lockstep” analysis that requires judges to interpret their state constitutions 
dependently on the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of analogous federal 
provisions; and also analyzing the Illinois Supreme Court’s attempt to reconcile prior 
rulings and formal adoption of a “limited lockstep” approach in Caballes). 
 38 See Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016). 
 39 See id. at 641. Again, on remand, Kansas courts could still find that even though 
there was no violation of the U.S. Constitution, there is a violation of the Kansas 
Constitution, thus rendering the United States Supreme Court’s opinion nugatory. 
 40 See Long, supra note 12, at 48–49. 
 41 For good discussions of the lockstep, limited lockstep, and independent 
jurisprudence approaches, which are sometimes hard to discern, see generally id., 
discussing the inconsistences in how state courts interpret their constitutions, and Robert F. 
Williams, Introduction, The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. SURV. 
AM. L. 211 (2003), discussing the various stages of new judicial federalism, which is 
characterized by independent interpretations of state constitutions. 
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Florida courts to follow the federal case law on federal rights in regard to 
“searches and seizures”42 and “cruel and unusual punishment.”43  
The advantage of this approach is its simplicity.44 The court does not need 
to research or think about two distinct approaches.45 If the federal case law on 
the Fourth Amendment says that a certain kind of search is valid, then the 
search is valid for both federal and state purposes. The only time the state 
court has to engage in original thinking is if the state provision has no federal 
counterpart.46 
The second approach is the limited lockstep approach. Under this 
approach, the state court judges its state constitutional provisions in 
accordance with the jurisprudence interpreting the corresponding or 
comparable federal provisions, unless it is clear from the language or the 
constitutional history of the provision that the state framers intended a 
different analysis.47 In effect, this presumption favors the federal 
jurisprudence;48 the burden is upon the party claiming a different analysis to 
show that the framers sought to have a separate jurisprudence.49 
Using this presumption seems inappropriate, especially where the 
language in the state constitution is not the same as the federal Constitution. 
Illinois provides one example. Illinois did not have any kind of lockstep 
approach until People v. Tisler.50 Only since that case was decided in 1984 has 
Illinois given “lockstep deference” to federal constitutional interpretation.51 
Although a few justices of the Illinois Supreme Court have objected to this 
approach, it seems clear that at least a majority of the current court prefers to 
                                                                                                                     
 42 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“Searches and seizures. . . . This right shall be construed in 
conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the 
United States Supreme Court.”). 
 43 Id. § 17 (“[T]he prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, shall be 
construed in conformity with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which interpret 
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provided in the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.”). 
 44 See Timothy P. O’Neill, Escape from Freedom: Why “Limited Lockstep” Betrays 
Our System of Federalism, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 332 (2014) (“‘Lockstep’ provides 
for mindless, formalistic uniformity.”). 
 45 See id. at 332–33. 
 46 Some critics have referred to this as the “lazy” approach for that reason. See, e.g., 
id. at 333 (“Lockstep’ is an intellectually lazy path pretending no more work is necessary 
because the ‘Truth’ has already been conclusively established by the United States 
Supreme Court.”). 
 47 See James K. Leven, A Roadmap to State Judicial Independence Under the Illinois 
Limited Lockstep Doctrine Predicated on the Intent of the Framers of the 1970 Illinois 
Constitution and Illinois Tradition, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 63, 102 (2012). 
 48 See Michele M. Jochner, Survey of Illinois Law: Search and Seizure Cases, 30 S. 
ILL. U. L.J. 785, 797 (2006). 
 49 See Leven, supra note 47, at 102. 
 50 People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 157 (Ill. 1984); see also Leven, supra note 47, at 
100; O’Neill, supra note 44, at 325. 
 51 See Leven, supra note 47, at 100. 
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keep this approach.52 In practice, this has meant that federal jurisprudence 
prevails, especially in search and seizure situations.53  
I consider this position untenable. The approach is ironic because Article I, 
Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution is not exactly the same as the Fourth 
Amendment.54 Nonetheless, the Illinois courts seem committed to using 
identical standards in interpreting both search and seizure provisions.55 There 
is apparently a fear that a separate jurisprudence for search and seizure would 
result in more decisions favoring criminal defendants because the state 
jurisprudence would hold more searches invalid.56 It is not clear if that would 
be so.57 One veteran of both prosecutions and defense practice in Illinois has 
told me that he thinks the result—valid versus invalid search—would be the 
same in ninety to ninety-five percent of the cases. 
The third approach is the independent jurisprudence approach.58 This 
approach gives the greatest weight to a state constitutional provision. Under 
this approach, the state court considers the issue purely under state 
constitutional grounds, without reference to federal jurisprudence.59 Only after 
deciding the state issue does the court consider the federal case law.60 
Sometimes the federal and state provisions are identical in language, as is the 
case with equal protection and due process language. Then, it may be 
                                                                                                                     
 52 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 53 For example, in Caballes II, the Illinois Supreme Court “held that the Illinois 
Constitution of 1970 does not afford greater protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure than does the federal constitution.” Jochner, supra note 48, at 799; see also 
Caballes II, 851 N.E.2d 26, 46 (Ill. 2006). 
 54 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.”), with ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The people shall have the right to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, 
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other 
means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 55 See Jochner, supra note 48, at 799. 
 56 See Anderson, supra note 37, at 1001–03. 
 57 See id. 
 58 This approach is also referred to as a “primacy” or “primary” approach. See, e.g., 
id. at 1002; Leven, supra note 47, at 66; Long, supra note 12, at 48. 
 59 See Anderson, supra note 37, at 1002 (“Under the . . . ‘primacy’ or ‘primary’ 
approach, ‘the state court undertakes an independent [state] constitutional analysis, using 
all the tools appropriate to the task, and relying upon federal decisional law only for 
guidance.’” (second alteration in original)). 
 60 See id.; see also Leven, supra note 47, at 66; Long, supra note 12, at 48 (“Only if 
the state constitution does not protect the right will the court go on to examine whether the 
Federal Constitution offers greater protection.”). 
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permissible to consider federal cases and cases in other states while 
considering the state constitutional provision.61 
Clearly, the independent jurisprudence approach most clearly follows the 
principles of interpretation proposed by Justice Brennan.62 It validates his 
thesis by seriously considering assertions of individual rights under state 
constitutions that may offer more protections. Alternatively, the lockstep and 
limited lockstep approaches vitiate his thesis by giving deference to the federal 
provisions. 
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF NEW STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THAT 
HAVE NO COUNTERPART IN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Further supporting Brennan’s thesis and the independent jurisprudence 
approach is the fact that states have constitutional rights without any federal 
counterpart. If there is no federal counterpart to a state constitutional right, 
how can there be any role for the lockstep or limited lockstep approach?  
Take, for example, the recent trend towards establishing a state 
constitutional right to “hunt and fish.”63 Beginning with Vermont in 1777, 
nineteen states have enacted such rights by constitutional referenda.64 It is not 
entirely clear what this right means and how courts should analyze claims 
asserting this constitutional right. Does it require a strict scrutiny analysis of 
any regulation of that right? Does the state bear a heavy burden to show why it 
requires a hunting license or fishing license? 
Constitutional rights unique to states do not stop there. On August 5, 2014, 
Missouri adopted a “right to farm.”65 It is also unclear what this right means. 
                                                                                                                     
 61 See Anderson, supra note 37, at 1002. 
 62 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 502 (“The essential point I am making . . . is simply 
that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding 
rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law.”). 
 63 See Douglas Shinkle, State Constitutional Right to Hunt and Fish, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/state-
constitutional-right-to-hunt-and-fish.aspx [https://perma.cc/45AL-KBKM] (last updated Nov. 
9, 2015). 
 64 Nineteen states guarantee the right to hunt and fish in their constitutions; seventeen 
of those states have provisions approved by the voters. Id. Vermont’s language dates back 
to 1777, and the rest of these constitutional provisions—in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming—have 
passed since 1996. Id. Two states, California and Rhode Island, have language in their 
respective constitutions guaranteeing only the right to fish, but not to hunt. Id. Because of 
Alaska’s strong case law history, advocates in that state also consider the state’s 
constitutional language—”Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and 
waters are reserved to the people for common use”—to meet the test. Id. See infra 
Appendix I for the full language of these provisions. 
 65 MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“That agriculture which provides food, energy, health 
benefits, and security is the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy. To 
protect this vital sector of Missouri’s economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to engage 
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Does it mean that farmers can resist attempts to put highways across their land 
through eminent domain? Reports indicate that the impetus for the amendment 
was to stop the efforts of animal rights activists to regulate the manner by 
which farmers raised animals.66 Advocates of the amendment believed that 
there should be a right for farmers to raise animals as they see fit.67 If that is 
true, then perhaps it was an anti-PETA amendment.68 
Apart from general claims based on federal due process or equal 
protection guarantees, there seem to be no federal counterparts to the rights to 
hunt, trap, fish, or farm. 
Additionally, over thirty states have enacted state constitutional provisions 
or statutes that might be called “the right to be free from foreign influence.”69 
Although the texts of the provisions vary, they frequently forbid the use of 
“international law” or “foreign law.”70 Nine states—Alabama, Arizona, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and 
Tennessee—have enacted measures regarding the application of foreign or 
religious law in state courts.71 Eight states enacted statutes, while Alabama 
changed its constitution in 2014.72  
A subset of this movement is the effort to amend state constitutions or pass 
statutes to forbid the use of “religious law” and specifically “Sharia,” the body 
of Islamic religious law.73 So far, only South Dakota’s provision specifically 
                                                                                                                     
in farming and ranching practices shall be forever guaranteed in this state, subject to duly 
authorized powers, if any, conferred by article VI of the Constitution of Missouri.”). 
 66 See Julie Bosman, Missourians Approve Amendment on Farming, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/us/right-to-farm-measure-passes-in-
missouri.html [https://perma.cc/M3EE-57AX]; Chris Kardish, Missouri’s ‘Right to Farm’ 
Vote Isn’t as Simple as It Sounds, GOVERNING (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.governing.com/ 
topics/transportation-infrastructure/gov-right-to-farm-missouri-ballot.html [https://perma.cc/ 
UJ73-ZC6K]. 
 67 See Kardish, supra note 66. 
 68 See Marshall Griffin, Gun Rights and ‘Right to Farm’ Amendments Misled Voters, 
Critics Tell Missouri Supreme Court, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Feb. 25, 2015), 
http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/gun-rights-and-right-farm-amendments-misled-voters-
critics-tell-missouri-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/9CDQ-Q7G4]. 
 69 See Appendix II infra for language of nine states’ provisions. 
 70 Apparently, thirty-two states have made this move, including Alabama, Arizona, 
Louisiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. 
See infra Appendix II; see also FAIZA PATEL ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & BRENNAN 
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AND PRACTICAL  
PROBLEMS 1, 49 n.1 (May 2013), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ForeignLawBans.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM39-QYND]. 
 71 See infra Appendix II. 
 72 See infra Appendix II; see also Greg Garrison, Amendment Banning ‘Foreign Law’ 
in Alabama Courts Passes; Will Be Added to Alabama Constitution, AL.COM (Nov. 4, 
2014), http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2014/11/amendment_banning_foreign_law.html 
[https://perma.cc/B8WZ-RMQ2]. 
 73 Sharia, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Sharia (shə-ree-ə). (1855) 
Islamic law. The body of Islamic religious law applicable to police, banking, business, 
contracts, and social issues. Sharia is a system of laws, rather than a codification of laws, 
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mentions “religious code.”74 The most talked about of these measures is that 
of Oklahoma, which led the way by forbidding the use of foreign law.75 
Originally, Oklahoma passed a constitutional amendment specifically banning 
Sharia law.76 Once that measure was struck down as unconstitutional by Awad 
v. Ziriax,77 the legislature passed a statute banning the use of “foreign law.”78 
These provisions may be dismissed as merely the result of xenophobia or 
Islamophobia, but to do so would ignore “real and ominous developments in 
Western countries with significant Muslim populations.”79 These provisions 
raise some serious issues. 
                                                                                                                     
based on the Koran and other Islamic sources.”); see Liz Farmer, Alabama Joins Wave of 
States Banning Foreign Laws, GOVERNING (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.governing.com/ 
topics/elections/gov-alabama-foreign-law-courts-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/G543-
GG2E]. 
 74 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (Supp. 2015) (prohibiting enforcement of any 
religious code: “No court, administrative agency, or other governmental agency may 
enforce any provisions of any religious code.”). 
 75 See generally Steven M. Rosato, Saving Oklahoma’s “Save Our State” 
Amendment: Sharia Law in the West and Suggestions to Protect Similar State Legislation 
from Constitutional Attack, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 659 (2014) (examining the 
constitutionality of state statutes or constitutional amendments that seek to ban the 
consideration of Sharia law in state courts). 
 76 The original provision states:  
C. The Courts provided for in subsection A of this section, when exercising their 
judicial authority, shall uphold and adhere to the law as provided in the United States 
Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, the United States Code, federal regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto, established common law, the Oklahoma Statutes and 
rules promulgated pursuant thereto, and if necessary the law of another state of the 
United States provided the law of the other state does not include Sharia Law, in 
making judicial decisions. The courts shall not look to the legal precepts of other 
nations or cultures. Specifically, the courts shall not consider international law or 
Sharia Law. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all cases before the 
respective courts including, but not limited to, cases of first impression.  
H.J.R. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010), invalidated by Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 
1111 (10th Cir. 2012).  
 77 Awad, 670 F.3d at 1117, 1119. 
 78 The new statute states: 
Any court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency ruling or decision shall 
violate the public policy of this state and be void and unenforceable if the court, 
arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency bases its rulings or decisions in the 
matter at issue in whole or in part on foreign law that would not grant the parties 
affected by the ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges 
granted under the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions, including but not limited 
to due process, freedom of religion, speech, or press, and any right of privacy or 
marriage as specifically defined by the Constitution of this state. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 20 (2015). 
 79 Rosato, supra note 75, at 660. 
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One issue is whether the state is seeking to prevent the application of 
federally negotiated treaties in state cases.80 If so, that effort will fail because 
treaties entered into by the United States are “the supreme Law of the Land.”81 
Another issue involves religious freedom, enshrined in the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment and in state constitutions.82 Yet another issue 
arises within the family law sphere. In a number of family situations such as 
marriage, dissolution of marriage, and inheritance, there is a role for religious 
customs and even religious law.83 For the most part, the state courts try to stay 
out of those controversies.84 If, however, a citizen of a state that forbids the 
use of religious law seeks to enforce a religious divorce, what will happen if 
one of the parties seeks redress in state courts? 
Another new right emerging in state constitutions involves health care.85 
There is a developing movement towards inserting a “right to health care” in 
state constitutions, although it is unclear what that right would entail.86 
                                                                                                                     
 80 See Daniel Mach & Chandra Bhatnagar, Oklahoma Can’t ‘Save’ Itself from the 
U.S. Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
daniel-mach/oklahoma-cant-save-itself_b_3786089.html [https://perma.cc/4YBP-C52W]. 
 81 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Mach & Bhatnagar, supra note 80.  
 82 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Christine M. Durham, What Goes Around Comes 
Around: The New Relevancy of State Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 
353, 354 (2004). See generally Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and 
Defenses Under State Constitutions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 107 (2013) 
(“[S]urveying the principal cases decided under each state’s religious freedom guarantee, 
whether expressed as ‘free exercise of religion,’ ‘freedom of worship,’ ‘liberty of 
conscience,’ ‘rights of conscience,’ or some other formulation.”). 
 83 See Linton, supra note 82, at 108–83 (containing a state-by-state examination and 
analysis of the role of religion in different types of family situations). 
 84 See generally Bruce Ledewitz, Experimenting with Religious Liberty: The Quasi-
Constitutional Status of Religious Exemptions, 6 ELON L. REV. 37 (2014) (discussing the 
proper role and scope of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws). 
 85 See Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our Rights: The 
Right to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 997, 1056 (2010). 
 86 Thirteen states have constitutional provisions mentioning health. See ALA. CONST. 
art. IV, § 93.12; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 19; HAW. CONST. 
art. IX, §§ 1, 3; ILL. CONST. pmbl., art. XI; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 8; MICH. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 51; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86; MO. CONST. art. 4, § 37; MONT. CONST. art II, § 3; N.Y. 
CONST. art. XVII, §§ 1, 3; S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 20. For text of 
these provisions, see the survey included in Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State 
Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1347–68 
(2010); see also Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional 
Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 
925–26 (2011) (exploring the phenomenon that state courts view socioeconomic 
constitutional provisions as nonjusticiable and therefore underutilize the state’s 
constitution’s authority); Hiroaki Matsuura, State Constitutional Commitment to Health 
and Health Care and Population Health Outcomes: Evidence from Historical US Data, 
105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH no. S3, July 2015, at e48, e48 (arguing that the existence of 
provisions correlates with positive outcomes of population health); Soohoo & Goldberg, 
supra note 85, at 1056–71. 
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Conversely, between 2010 and 2015, at least twenty-two state legislatures 
enacted measures relating to challenging or opting out of the federal 
Affordable Care Act (Obamacare),87 and five states enacted constitutional 
provisions to prevent the application of the Affordable Care Act in that state.88 
It is unclear how a state can prevent the application of a federal law apart from 
refusing to accept federal funds offered to assist the state in implementing the 
federal law.  
Each of the new state constitutional rights described above has no federal 
counterpart. These unique provisions will require state courts to analyze what 
exactly each right entails, and the courts will be unable to rely on federal 
jurisprudence on comparable federal constitutional rights for their decisions. 
Thus, state courts that normally take the lockstep or limited lockstep approach 
would be forced to create a body of law only for these unique constitutional 
rights, despite not doing this for state constitutional provisions with a federal 
counterpart. Alternatively, by taking the independent jurisprudence approach, 
the state courts could treat each state constitutional right similarly by first 
considering all issues purely under state constitutional grounds without 
reference to federal jurisprudence. This seems to be the fairest approach. 
                                                                                                                     
 87 See C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & JANET KINZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43289, 
LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS TO REPEAL, DEFUND, OR DELAY THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2015) 
(summarizing legislative actions taken to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the 
Affordable Care Act since it was enacted); Richard Cauchi, State Laws and Actions 
Challenging Certain Health Reforms, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-actions-challenging-ppaca.aspx [https:// 
perma.cc/PM54-JLMG] (last updated Mar. 17, 2016). 
 88 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.04(a) (“In order to preserve the freedom of all residents 
of Alabama to provide for their own health care, a law or rule shall not compel, directly or 
indirectly, any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care 
system.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. XVII § 2(A), preempted by Coons v. Lew, 762 F.3d 891 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (“A. To preserve the freedom of Arizonans to provide for their health care: 1. A 
law or rule shall not compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer or health care 
provider to participate in any health care system.”); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 21 (“(A) No 
federal, state, or local law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, 
or health care provider to participate in a health care system. (B) No federal, state, or local 
law or rule shall prohibit the purchase or sale of health care or health insurance. (C) No 
federal, state, or local law or rule shall impose a penalty or fine for the sale or purchase of 
health care or health insurance.”); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 37(B) (“To preserve the freedom 
of Oklahomans to provide for their health care: 1. A law or rule shall not compel, directly 
or indirectly, any person, employer or health care provider to participate in any health care 
system . . . .”); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 38 (“(a) Each competent adult shall have the right to 
make his or her own health care decisions. The parent, guardian or legal representative of 
any other natural person shall have the right to make health care decisions for that person. 
(b) Any person may pay, and a health care provider may accept, direct payment for health 
care without imposition of penalties or fines for doing so.”). 
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V. WHEN THERE SHOULD BE NATIONAL UNIFORMITY IN  
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND WHEN THE STATES MAY  
VARY FROM NATIONAL OR UNIFORM STANDARDS 
When state constitutional rights do have a federal counterpart, the lockstep 
and limited lockstep doctrine effectively promote uniformity between states 
regarding those constitutional rights. The argument for uniformity is based 
upon the concept of “federal citizenship,” i.e., that as a citizen of the United 
States all of us have certain basic rights that we carry with us as we move from 
state to state.89 In effect, the federal rights are a “floor,” a minimum number of 
rights enjoyed by all United States citizens.90 
In a society as mobile as twenty-first century America, this argument 
carries considerable weight. As we travel from state to state on the interstate 
highway system, we might well want to have the same rights as we cross 
borders. But as one drives one’s car from state to state, is it necessary that 
there be the same rules regarding police searches of that car? As Roy Caballes 
drove from Iowa across Illinois towards Indiana, he passed through states that 
may have had very different approaches to police stops and “dog sniffs.” Is 
that necessarily bad? If Illinois places greater strictures upon searches and 
seizures that occur within Illinois, why should Iowa and Indiana care?  
A. How State Constitutional Analysis Affects Federal Constitutional 
Analysis 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on how federal jurisprudence affects 
state courts’ analysis of state constitutional rights. However, decisions based 
on state constitutions can also impact analysis of rights asserted under the 
federal Constitution. Two examples are cases involving the issue of same sex 
marriage and cases involving the right to counsel for indigents accused of a 
crime. 
The most recent important development in the trend toward national 
uniformity has been the same sex marriage, or marriage equality, movement. 
On state constitutional grounds, the same sex marriage issue began with 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health in 2003.91 There, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Massachusetts Constitution 
forbade the state from depriving two people of the same sex of the right to 
marry.92 Litigation in other states ensued, all based on those states’ 
constitutions.93 Almost immediately, some states redefined marriage in their 
                                                                                                                     
 89 See Linda White Atkins, Federalism, Uniformity, and the State Constitution—State 
v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 569, 584 (1987). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 92 Id. at 948.  
 93 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), abrogated by Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (actually antedating Goodridge in some respects). Cases subsequent 
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state constitutions, stating that marriage could be only between one man and 
one woman.94 
The stage was set for federal action. Congress had enacted the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996.95 It defined marriage for federal purposes as 
being between a man and a woman, and it also allowed states to not recognize 
the same sex marriage of another state.96 When the United States Supreme 
Court held DOMA unconstitutional in United States v. Windsor,97 the issue 
was joined at the federal level. Clearly, marriage status, once almost 
exclusively the province of the states, was now a federal issue.98 
As each federal circuit court of appeals panel held that the Federal 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause required the states to allow same sex 
marriages, it was clear that the United States Supreme Court would have to 
decide the issue.99 Normally, however, the United States Supreme Court waits 
until there is a conflict among the circuit courts. It is important to note that the 
Court seemed to be in no hurry to take a same sex marriage case.100 
The only issue was one of timing: when would the United States Supreme 
Court feel compelled to take a same sex marriage case? The Court appeared to 
be waiting to see if each circuit court panel would rule, preferably with 
unanimity.101 At one point, the Court might have felt that there was a federal 
consensus favoring same sex marriage as a federal constitutional right. 
                                                                                                                     
to Goodridge include, for example, Lockyer v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 
(Cal. 2004), Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008), and 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006), abrogated by Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 94 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25, preempted by Hamby v. Parnell, 56 
F. Supp. 3d 1056 (D. Alaska 2014); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32, 
invalidated by De Leon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015); WIS. CONST. art. XIII, 
§ 13, invalidated by Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). See generally Mark E. 
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Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589 (2004).  
 95 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). 
 96 1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 97 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675–76 (2013). 
 98 See Tom Watts, From Windsor to Obergefell: The Struggle for Marriage Equality 
Continued, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S52, S58 (2015). 
 99 See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2931, and 
cert. denied sub nom. Idaho v. Latta, 135 S. Ct. 2931, and cert. dismissed sub nom. Coal. 
for the Prot. of Marriage v. Sevcik, 136 S. Ct. 13 (2015); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 
(7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316, and cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Wolf, 
135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 271; Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308, 
and cert. denied sub nom. Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (2014), and cert. denied sub 
nom. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265. 
 100 See generally Chris Geidner, Cert. Denied, Stays Denied, Marriage Equality 
Advanced, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 161 (2015).  
 101 See id. 
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The issue of a uniform federal right to marry a person of one’s own sex 
came to a head in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.102 In DeBoer v. Snyder, 
a panel of that circuit held, 2–1, that the issue of same sex marriage should be 
left to the state legislatures.103 This holding conflicted with other circuits, 
which held states’ attempt to ban same sex marriage unconstitutional.104 When 
the plaintiffs did not petition for a rehearing en banc, it was clear that the 
circuits were in conflict, and that the United States Supreme Court would need 
to decide the issue.105 
On June 26, 2015, the United States Supreme Court issued Obergefell v. 
Hodges, effectively deciding the issue of a federal right to marry a person of 
one’s own sex.106 It was not surprising that the vote was 5–4.107 Perhaps it was 
also not surprising that it took many different cases, following a convoluted 
route, to get the case before the highest court.108 
These case histories provide several lessons. One lesson is that litigation 
over state constitutional provisions is often a necessary step in deciding 
whether there is a need for a federal, uniform right.109 If it had not been for 
Goodridge and other state constitutional developments, there would have been 
no Obergefell—or at least, the route to the United States Supreme Court would 
have been quite different.110 
Same sex marriage is not the first example of the route to achieve a result 
first through state constitutions and then eventually through the federal 
constitution. An earlier example of this phenomenon is the right to counsel for 
indigents accused of a crime.111 State constitutions frequently provide for a 
“right to counsel,” and some states have provided the funds to employ public 
defenders to assist indigents in their defense.112 Yet, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Betts v. Brady that a right to counsel did not exist at the 
                                                                                                                     
 102 See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404–08 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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 104 See Watts, supra note 98, at S55. 
 105 See John A. Sparks, Conflict Between the Circuits: Gay Marriage Back on  
the Supreme Court’s Table, CTR. FOR VISION & VALUES (Nov. 21, 2014), 
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 108 See Watts, supra note 98, at S58–S77. 
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federal level for defendants unable to afford a lawyer when a state brought the 
criminal charges.113 
By 1960, it was clear most states realized that, whatever the federal right 
was or was not, it was necessary to the administration of justice to have proper 
representation for all those accused of a crime.114 By the early 1960s, only five 
states refused to offer legal counsel to indigents accused of felonies: Alabama, 
Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina.115 It was probably 
no coincidence that all of the hold-out states were in the South, where a 
disproportionate share of the accused was impoverished black males.116 
Guided by the vast majority of states, the United States Supreme Court, 
too, soon realized that proper representation for indigent defendants was 
necessary for justice.117 To establish this right, there is some evidence that the 
Supreme Court was simply looking for the proper case to use as a vehicle for 
overruling Betts v. Brady.118 It found that case when a white drifter, convicted 
of burglary in Florida, wrote the Court from his prison cell.119 
The Court appointed a distinguished lawyer, Abe Fortas, to represent the 
indigent defendant, Clarence Earl Gideon.120 It is almost certain that the Court 
engineered Gideon v. Wainwright. But look how long it took for the Court to 
come to the realization that there was a need for national uniformity and the 
great role that the states played in bringing the Court to reach that 
conclusion.121 
B. Developing Issues in the Relationship Between Federal and State 
Constitutional Rights 
Let us now consider some developing issues in the relationship between 
federal and state constitutional rights. Two salient examples are the taking of 
private property from one person to give to another private person and the 
privacy issues arising in an era of breathtaking technological developments.  
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 114 See Charles C. Brown, Jr., Betts v. Brady—After Twenty Years, 17 INTRAMURAL L. 
REV. N.Y.U. 304, 305–09 (1962). 
 115 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 133 (1964). 
 116 See id. at 147–48. 
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The leading case on private takings in recent years has been Kelo v. City of 
New London.122 This much criticized case was a 5–4 opinion in the United 
States Supreme Court.123 The decision allowed a city in Connecticut, possibly 
under the influence of corruption, to declare some private homes “blighted” 
and have them moved or torn down so that the city could transfer the land to 
Pfizer Pharmaceuticals to build a new headquarters and an industrial 
complex.124 The justification for the enrichment of the coffers of Pfizer, a 
private company, at the expense of private homeowners was economic 
development.125 The city claimed that studies showed the Pfizer development 
would create new jobs and provide much needed tax revenue for the residents 
of New London.126 Economic development, it said, was a “public use,” and 
the Supreme Court sided with the city.127  
The states have created their own jurisprudence on economic development 
takings, often rejecting Kelo. Three years before Kelo, the Illinois Supreme 
Court had held a similar plan invalid in Southwest Illinois Development 
Authority v. National City Environmental.128 The Southwest Illinois 
Development Authority (SWIDA) was a state agency created to promote 
economic development in southwestern Illinois.129 It helped create a private 
racetrack, and, when the racetrack needed a larger parking lot, SWIDA 
condemned a nearby privately owned landfill.130 There was no indication of 
blight, and there was apparently no master plan for development of the area, as 
had been the case in Kelo.131 For all of those reasons, and because state rights, 
not federal rights, were involved, the Illinois Supreme Court sided with the 
landfill owner.132 
Illinois has certainly not been the only state to choose a path separate from 
the deference to state officials accorded by the Kelo case. Because forty-five 
states enacted legislation or state constitutional amendments to prevent Kelo-
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 123 Id.at 470. 
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 132 Id. at 11. 
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style decisions in those states,133 it is impossible to delineate those 
developments here in detail. It is safe to say that the citizens of most states, the 
state legislatures, and to a great extent the state courts, have soundly rejected 
the type of transfer of private property validated in Kelo.134  
The second issue that may be spawning a separate jurisprudence in the 
states is that of privacy in an era of rapidly changing technology. The leading 
recent case in the United States Supreme Court is probably United States v. 
Jones.135 In Jones, all nine Justices made it clear that the private owner of a 
car had an expectation of privacy, and that police could not attach a global 
positioning system (GPS) device to the bottom of the car without a warrant, at 
least in most instances.136 The discussion in the opinions definitely show an 
awareness of the technological capabilities of both public law enforcement 
officers and private parties in establishing a surveillance of a private citizen 
unaware that he or she is being surveilled.137 
Sooner or later, the courts, including the United States Supreme Court, 
must address an even newer development, that of commercial or hobby 
drones.138 By this, I mean privately owned drones, not military drones. Every 
day one can see drones in the air space of Chicago and its suburbs. Amazon 
has even proposed the use of drones to send packages to customers requesting 
speedy delivery.139  
Apart from the safety issues, it is clear that some drones could easily 
invade privacy.140 Some drones carry cameras.141 The people near a drone 
have no idea whether they are being photographed, i.e., surveilled, and have 
no effective way of stopping the drone. Here is an example: in the autumn of 
2015, a friend asked me if I had seen the drone outside my office window the 
previous day. I said I had not. She said the drone flew over a nearby small 
park, climbed to a height just outside my eighth floor window and then 
climbed even higher to clear a taller office building to the west. I have to 
wonder if that drone took pictures of my office—and possibly me—while I 
was unaware of the activity. In any event, why was that drone outside my 
window? 
There are reports of homeowners shooting down drones flying above their 
houses and yards. One homeowner in the South is reported to have shot down 
                                                                                                                     
 133 See Blackman, supra note 117, at 256. 
 134 For an excellent discussion of these developments, see id. at 261. 
 135 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 136 Id. at 9, 12. 
 137 See generally id. 
 138 See generally Matthew R. Koerner, Note, Drones and the Fourth Amendment: 
Redefining Expectations of Privacy, 64 DUKE L.J. 1129 (2015) (analyzing drones against 
the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).  
 139 Amazon Unveils Futuristic Plan: Delivery by Drone, CBS NEWS (Dec. 1, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-unveils-futuristic-plan-delivery-by-drone/ [https:// 
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 140 See Koerner, supra note 138, at 1143–47. 
 141 See id. at 1158. 
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a drone with his firearm.142 When the private owner of the drone objected to 
the destruction of his drone, the homeowner said that if any drone flew so low 
over his property, he could shoot it because it was a drone that was invading 
his airspace and his privacy.143 Absent federal regulation, the states will have 
to determine when drones invade privacy by using state standards.144 
The standards for drones may well vary from state to state.145 We in 
Chicago are used to being in the public eye, so to speak. As city dwellers, we 
may not care about drones outside our office windows as much as Southern 
rural homeowners might be upset by drones flying low over their backyards. 
What will happen when there is litigation? The Illinois Constitution contains a 
specific “right to privacy” in Article I, Section 6.146 Will Illinois courts be 
vigorous in their defense of that right in the face of GPS and drone 
technology? Will Illinois courts be vigorous in protecting Illinoisans from 
warrantless surveillance by the government, a danger Edward Snowden 
revealed to us?147 
In other words, is the government or a private party less able to snoop 
under state law than under federal law? How will we as a people reconcile the 
federal constitutional issues with the state constitutional issues? As the articles 
in this symposium suggest, there will always be a tension between the federal 
and state jurisprudence on individual rights.  
In his article, Justice Brennan sought to persuade the state courts to find 
more rights in their state constitutions than the Burger Court had found in the 
Federal Constitution.148 Brennan was right but for the wrong reasons. It is not 
a matter of the states finding more rights than the federal courts do. Federal 
decisions on federal rights will ebb and flow in cycles. What is important is 
that we preserve the federalism of the federal and state rights. It is this dual 
nature of individual rights in the United States that creates a competition in the 
interaction between federal and state rights.149  
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In effect, individual rights are a continuous public conversation. And that 
is how it should be and will be.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nearly forty years after Justice Brennan’s article, many questions still 
remain as to the proper role of state constitutions in the federal system. And 
today, as states and the federal government prepare to respond and adapt to 
technology and other modern developments, we may continue to observe the 
delicate shifting of power between state constitutional sovereignty and federal 
supremacy. However, despite the lingering questions, it is apparent that, in at 
least some states, the “new federalism” championed by Brennan is alive and 
well. 
                                                                                                                     
Illinois Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 53 (2014), 
and O’Neill, supra note 44.  
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APPENDIX I: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES TO HUNT AND FISH 
Alabama 
Sportsperson’s Bill of Rights. 
All persons shall have the right to hunt and fish in this state in 
accordance with law and regulations. 
ALA. CONST. amend. 597 (ratified in 1996). 
Alaska 
Common Use. 
Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and 
waters are reserved to the people for common use. 
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
Arkansas 
[Right to Hunt, Fish, Trap, and Harvest Wildlife] 
(a)(1) Citizens of the State of Arkansas have a right to hunt, 
fish, trap, and harvest wildlife. 
(2) The right to hunt, fish, trap, and harvest wildlife shall 
be subject only to regulations that promote sound wildlife 
conservation and management and are consistent with 
Amendment 35 of the Arkansas Constitution. 
(b) Public hunting, fishing, and trapping shall be a preferred 
means of managing and controlling nonthreatened species and 
citizens may use traditional methods for harvesting wildlife. 
(c) Nothing in this amendment shall be construed to alter, 
repeal, or modify: 
(1) Any provision of Amendment 35 to the Arkansas 
Constitution; 
(2) Any common law or statute relating to trespass, 
private property rights, eminent domain, public ownership 
of property, or any law concerning firearms unrelated to 
hunting; or 
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 (3) The sovereign immunity of the State of Arkansas. 
ARK. CONST. amend. 88, § 1 (adopted Nov. 2, 2010). 
California 
Fishing rights over public lands; legislative regulation. 
The people shall have the right to fish upon and from the 
public lands of the State and in the waters thereof, excepting 
upon lands set aside for fish hatcheries, and no land owned by 
the State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in 
the people the absolute right to fish thereupon; and no law 
shall ever be passed making it a crime for the people to enter 
upon the public lands within this State for the purpose of 
fishing in any water containing fish that have been planted 
therein by the State; provided, that the Legislature may by 
statute, provide for the season when and the conditions under 
which the different species of fish may be taken.  
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted Nov. 8, 1910). 
Georgia 
Fishing and Hunting. 
The tradition of fishing and hunting and the taking of fish and 
wildlife shall be preserved for the people and shall be 
managed by law and regulation for the public good. 
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 28 (adopted Nov. 7, 2006). 
Idaho 
The rights to hunt, fish and trap. 
The rights to hunt, fish and trap, including by the use of 
traditional methods, are a valued part of the heritage of the 
State of Idaho and shall forever be preserved for the people 
and managed through the laws, rules and proclamations that 
preserve the future of hunting, fishing and trapping. Public 
hunting, fishing and trapping of wildlife shall be a preferred 
means of managing wildlife. The rights set forth herein do not 
create a right to trespass on private property, shall not affect 
rights to divert, appropriate and use water, or establish any 
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minimum amount of water in any water body, shall not lead to 
a diminution of other private rights, and shall not prevent the 
suspension or revocation, pursuant to statute enacted by the 
Legislature, of an individual’s hunting, fishing or trapping 
license. 
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 23 (adopted Nov. 6, 2012). 
Kentucky 
Personal right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife—Limitations. 
The citizens of Kentucky have the personal right to hunt, fish, 
and harvest wildlife, using traditional methods, subject only to 
statutes enacted by the Legislature, and to administrative 
regulations adopted by the designated state agency to promote 
wildlife conservation and management and to preserve the 
future of hunting and fishing. Public hunting and fishing shall 
be a preferred means of managing and controlling wildlife. 
This section shall not be construed to modify any provision of 
law relating to trespass, property rights, or the regulation of 
commercial activities. 
KY. CONST. § 255A (adopted Nov. 6, 2012). 
Louisiana 
Freedom to Hunt, Fish and Trap. 
The freedom to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife, including all 
aquatic life, traditionally taken by hunters, trappers and 
anglers, is a valued natural heritage that shall be forever 
preserved for the people. Hunting, fishing and trapping shall 
be managed by law and regulation consistent with Article IX, 
Section I of the Constitution of Louisiana to protect, conserve 
and replenish the natural resources of the state. The provisions 
of this Section shall not alter the burden of proof requirements 
otherwise established by law for any challenge to a law or 
regulation pertaining to hunting, fishing or trapping the 
wildlife of the state, including all aquatic life. Nothing 
contained herein shall be construed to authorize the use of 
private property to hunt, fish, or trap without the consent of 
the owner of the property. 
LA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (adopted Nov. 2, 2004). 
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Minnesota 
Preservation of hunting and fishing. 
Hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a 
valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for 
the people and shall be managed by law and regulation for the 
public good. 
MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 12 (adopted Nov. 3, 1998). 
Mississippi 
Right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife. 
The people have the right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife, 
including by the use of traditional methods, subject only to 
laws and regulations that promote wildlife conservation and 
management and that preserve the future of hunting and 
fishing, as the Legislature may prescribe by general law. 
Public hunting and fishing shall be a preferred means of 
managing and controlling wildlife. This section may not be 
construed to modify any provision of law relating to trespass, 
property rights, the regulation of commercial activities or the 
maintenance of levees pursuant to Article 11. 
MISS. CONST. ANN. art. 3, § 12A (adopted Nov. 4, 2014). 
Montana 
Preservation of harvest heritage. 
The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild game animals is 
a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual 
citizens of the state and does not create a right to trespass on 
private property or diminution of other private rights. 
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (adopted Nov. 2, 2004). 
Nebraska 
Right to hunt, to fish, and to harvest wildlife; public hunting, 
fishing, and harvesting of wildlife; preferred means of 
managing and controlling wildlife. 
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The citizens of Nebraska have the right to hunt, to fish, and to 
harvest wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, 
subject only to laws, rules, and regulations regarding 
participation and that promote wildlife conservation and 
management and that preserve the future of hunting, fishing, 
and harvesting of wildlife. Public hunting, fishing, and 
harvesting of wildlife shall be a preferred means of managing 
and controlling wildlife. This section shall not be construed to 
modify any provision of law relating to trespass or property 
rights. This section shall not be construed to modify any 
provision of law relating to Article XV, section 4, Article XV, 
section 5, Article XV, section 6, or Article XV, section 7, of 
this constitution. 
NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 25 (adopted Nov. 6, 2012). 
North Dakota 
[Right to hunt, trap and fish.] 
Hunting, trapping, and fishing and the taking of game and fish 
are a valued part of our heritage and will be forever preserved 
for the people and managed by law and regulation for the 
public good. 
N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27 (adopted Nov. 7, 2000). 
Oklahoma 
Right to hunt, fish, trap and harvest game and fish. 
All citizens of this state shall have a right to hunt, fish, trap, 
and harvest game and fish, subject only to reasonable 
regulation as prescribed by the Legislature and the Wildlife 
Conservation Commission. The Wildlife Conservation 
Commission shall have the power and authority to approve 
methods, practices and procedures for hunting, trapping, 
fishing and the taking of game and fish. Traditional methods, 
practices and procedures shall be allowed for taking game and 
fish that are not identified as threatened by law or by the 
Commission. Hunting, fishing, and trapping shall be the 
preferred means of managing game and fish that are not 
identified as threatened by law or by the Commission. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify any 
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provision of common law or statutes relating to trespass, 
eminent domain, or any other property rights. 
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 36 (adopted Nov. 4, 2008). 
Rhode Island 
Fishery rights—Shore privileges—Preservation of natural 
resources. 
The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the 
rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore, to which they 
have been heretofore entitled under the charter and usages of 
this state, including but not limited to fishing from the shore, 
the gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea 
and passage along the shore; and they shall be secure in their 
rights to the use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the 
state with due regard for the preservation of their values; and 
it shall be the duty of the general assembly to provide for the 
conservation of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral and 
other natural resources of the state, and to adopt all means 
necessary and proper by law to protect the natural 
environment of the people of the state by providing adequate 
resource planning for the control and regulation of the use of 
the natural resources of the state and for the preservation, 
regeneration and restoration of the natural environment of the 
state. 
R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17 (amended Nov. 3, 1970). 
South Carolina 
Hunting and fishing.  
The traditions of hunting and fishing are valuable parts of the 
state’s heritage, important for conservation, and a protected 
means of managing nonthreatened wildlife. The citizens of 
this State have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest wildlife 
traditionally pursued, subject to laws and regulations 
promoting sound wildlife conservation and management as 
prescribed by the General Assembly. Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to abrogate any private property rights,  
 
 
414 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:2 
existing state laws or regulations, or the state’s sovereignty 
over its natural resources. 
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 25 (adopted Nov. 2, 2010). 
Tennessee 
[Fish and game.] 
The General Assembly shall have power to enact laws for the 
protection and preservation of Game and Fish, within the 
State, and such laws may be enacted for and applied and 
enforced in particular Counties or geographical districts, 
designated by the General Assembly.  
The citizens of this state shall have the personal right to hunt 
and fish, subject to reasonable regulations and restrictions 
prescribed by law. The recognition of this right does not 
abrogate any private or public property rights, nor does it limit 
the state’s power to regulate commercial activity. Traditional 
manners and means may be used to take non-threatened 
species. 
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 13 (adopted Nov. 2, 2010). 
Texas 
Right to Hunt, Fish, and Harvest Wildlife. 
(a) The people have the right to hunt, fish, and harvest 
wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, subject to 
laws or regulations to conserve and manage wildlife and 
preserve the future of hunting and fishing. 
(b) Hunting and fishing are preferred methods of managing 
and controlling wildlife. 
(c) This section does not affect any provision of law relating 
to trespass, property rights, or eminent domain. 
(d) This section does not affect the power of the legislature to 
authorize a municipality to regulate the discharge of a weapon 
in a populated area in the interest of public safety. 
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 34 (added Nov. 3, 2015). 
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Vermont 
[Hunting; fowling and fishing.] 
The inhabitants of this State shall have liberty in seasonable 
times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on other 
lands not inclosed, and in like manner to fish in all boatable 
and other waters (not private property) under proper 
regulations, to be made and provided by the General 
Assembly. 
VT. CONST. § 67. 
Virginia 
Right of the people to hunt, fish, and harvest game. 
The people have a right to hunt, fish, and harvest game, 
subject to such regulations and restrictions as the General 
Assembly may prescribe by general law. 
VA. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (adopted Nov. 7, 2000). 
Wisconsin 
Right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game. 
The people have the right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game 
subject only to reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law. 
WIS. CONST. art. I, § 26 (adopted Apr. 1, 2003). 
Wyoming 
Opportunity to hunt, fish and trap. 
The opportunity to fish, hunt and trap wildlife is a heritage 
that shall forever be preserved to the individual citizens of the 
state, subject to regulation as prescribed by law, and does not 
create a right to trespass on private property, diminish other 
private rights or alter the duty of the state to manage wildlife. 
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 39 (adopted Nov. 6, 2012). 
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APPENDIX II: STATE PROVISIONS PREVENTING THE APPLICATION OF 
FEDERALLY NEGOTIATED TREATIES IN STATE CASES 
Alabama 
(a) This amendment shall be known and may be cited as the 
American and Alabama Laws for Alabama Courts 
Amendment. 
(b) The law of Alabama provides: 
(1) The State of Alabama has developed its unique public 
policy of laws based on the United States Constitution, as 
protected by Amendment 10 to the United States 
Constitution. 
(2) Upon becoming a state in 1819, Alabama adopted its 
first constitutional and statutory enactments, upon which it 
has built the rights, privileges, obligations, and 
requirements of its government and citizens. 
(3) Both the provisions of the Alabama Constitution and 
the statutes and regulations of the State of Alabama, with 
interpreting opinions by its courts of competent 
jurisdiction, have developed the state’s public policy. 
(4) The public policy of the State of Alabama protects the 
unique rights of its citizens beginning with Article I, 
Section 1 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, 
guaranteeing the equality and rights of men. Except as 
permitted by due process of law and the right of the 
people to vote for self-determination, the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of the citizens of the State of 
Alabama are inviolate. 
(5) Different from the law of the State of Alabama is 
foreign law, which is any law, rule, or legal code, or 
system established, used, or applied in a jurisdiction 
outside of the states or territories of the United States, or 
which exist as a separate body of law, legal code, or 
system adopted or used anywhere by any people, group, 
or culture different from the Constitution and laws of the 
United States or the State of Alabama. 
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(6) Alabama has a favorable business climate and has 
attracted many international businesses. While Alabama 
business persons and companies may decide to use foreign 
law in foreign courts, the public policy of Alabama is to 
prohibit anyone from requiring Alabama courts to apply 
and enforce foreign laws. 
(7) The public policy of this state is to protect its citizens 
from the application of foreign laws when the application 
of a foreign law will result in the violation of a right 
guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution or of the United 
States Constitution, including, but not limited to, due 
process, freedom of religion, speech, assembly, or press, 
or any right of privacy or marriage. 
(8) Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution 
provides that full faith and credit shall be given by each 
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings 
of other states. Provided, however, when any such public 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings of another state 
violate the public policy of the State of Alabama, the State 
of Alabama is not and shall not be required to give full 
faith and credit thereto. 
(c) A court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or other 
adjudicative, arbitrative, or enforcement authority shall not 
apply or enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate any 
state law or a right guaranteed by the Constitution of this state 
or of the United States. 
(d) If any contractual provision or agreement provides for the 
choice of a foreign law to govern its interpretation or the 
resolution of any dispute between the parties, and if the 
enforcement or interpretation of the contractual provision or 
agreement would result in a violation of a right guaranteed by 
the Constitution of this state or of the United States, the 
agreement or contractual provision shall be modified or 
amended to the extent necessary to preserve the constitutional 
rights of the parties. 
(e) If any contractual provision or agreement provides for the 
choice of venue or forum outside of the states or territories of 
the United States, and if the enforcement or interpretation of 
the contract or agreement applying that choice of venue or 
forum provision would result in a violation of any right 
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guaranteed by the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States, that contractual provision or agreement shall be 
interpreted or construed to preserve the constitutional rights of 
the person against whom enforcement is sought. If a natural 
person subject to personal jurisdiction in this state seeks to 
maintain litigation, arbitration, an administrative proceeding, 
or a similarly binding proceeding in this state, and if a court of 
this state finds that granting a claim of forum non conveniens 
or a related claim violates or would likely lead to the violation 
of the constitutional rights of the nonclaimant in the foreign 
forum with respect to the matter in dispute, the claim shall be 
denied. 
(f) Any contractual provision or agreement incapable of being 
modified or amended in order to preserve the constitutional 
rights of the parties pursuant to the provisions of this 
amendment shall be null and void. 
(g) Nothing in this amendment shall be interpreted to limit the 
right of a natural person or entity of this state to voluntarily 
restrict or limit his, her, or its own constitutional rights by 
contract or specific waiver consistent with constitutional 
principles. However, the language of any such contract or 
other waiver shall be strictly construed in favor of preserving 
the constitutional rights of the natural person in this state. 
Further, no Alabama court shall be required by any contract or 
other obligation entered into by a person or entity to apply or 
enforce any foreign law. 
(h) Except as limited by subsection (g), without prejudice to 
any legal right, this amendment shall not apply to a 
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business 
association, or other legal entity that contracts to subject itself 
to foreign law in a jurisdiction other than this state or the 
United States. 
(i) Where the public acts, records, or judicial proceedings of 
another state violate the public policy of the State of Alabama, 
the State of Alabama shall not give full faith and credit 
thereto. 
ALA. CONST. amend. 884. 
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Arizona 
A court, arbitrator, administrative agency or other 
adjudicative, mediation or enforcement authority shall not 
enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right 
guaranteed by the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States or conflict with the laws of the United States or of this 
state. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3103 (Supp. 2015). 
Kansas 
Any court, arbitration, tribunal or administrative agency ruling 
or decision shall violate the public policy of this state and be 
void and unenforceable if the court, arbitration, tribunal or 
administrative agency bases its rulings or decisions in the 
matter at issue in whole or in part on any foreign law, legal 
code or system that would not grant the parties affected by the 
ruling or decision the same fundamental liberties, rights and 
privileges granted under the United States and Kansas 
constitutions, including, but not limited to, equal protection, 
due process, free exercise of religion, freedom of speech or 
press, and any right of privacy or marriage. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (West Supp. 2015). 
Louisiana 
B. The legislature finds that it shall be the public policy of this 
state to protect its citizens from the application of foreign laws 
when the application of a foreign law will result in the 
violation of a right guaranteed by the constitution of this state 
or of the United States, including but not limited to due 
process, freedom of religion, speech, or press, and any right of 
privacy or marriage as specifically defined by the constitution 
of this state. 
C. A court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or other 
adjudicative, mediation, or enforcement authority shall not 
enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right 
guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the United 
States. 
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D. If any contractual provision or agreement provides for the 
choice of a foreign law to govern its interpretation or the 
resolution of any dispute between the parties, and if the 
enforcement or interpretation of the contractual provision or 
agreement would result in a violation of a right guaranteed by 
the constitution of this state or of the United States, the 
agreement or contractual provision shall be modified or 
amended to the extent necessary to preserve the constitutional 
rights of the parties. 
E. If any contractual provision or agreement provides for the 
choice of venue or forum outside of the states or territories of 
the United States, and if the enforcement or interpretation of 
the contract or agreement applying that choice of venue or 
forum provision would result in a violation of any right 
guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the United 
States, that contractual provision or agreement shall be 
interpreted or construed to preserve the constitutional rights of 
the person against whom enforcement is sought. Similarly, if a 
natural person subject to personal jurisdiction in this state 
seeks to maintain litigation, arbitration, agency, or similarly 
binding proceedings in this state, and if a court of this state 
finds that granting a claim of forum non conveniens or a 
related claim violates or would likely lead to the violation of 
the constitutional rights of the nonclaimant in the foreign 
forum with respect to the matter in dispute, the claim shall be 
denied. 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (Supp. 2015). 
Mississippi 
Application of foreign laws in judicial proceedings. 
(1) In this section, “foreign law” means any law, rule, legal 
code or legal system other than the constitution, laws and 
ratified treaties of the United States and the territories of the 
United States, the constitution and laws of another state of the 
United States, Native American tribal law, the Mississippi 
Constitution of 1890, and the laws of this state. 
(2) A court, arbitrator, administrative agency or other 
adjudicative, mediation or enforcement authority shall not 
enforce a foreign law if doing so would violate a right 
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guaranteed to a natural person by the United States 
Constitution or the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-63-1 (West Supp. 2015). 
North Carolina 
In recognition that the United States Constitution and the 
Constitution of North Carolina constitute the supreme law of 
this State, the General Assembly hereby declares it to be the 
public policy of this State to protect its citizens from the 
application of foreign law that would result in the violation of 
a fundamental constitutional right of a natural person. The 
public policies expressed in this section shall apply only to 
actual or foreseeable violations of a fundamental 
constitutional right resulting from the application of the 
foreign law. 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-87.13 (2015). 
Oklahoma 
B. Any court, arbitration, tribunal, or administrative agency 
ruling or decision shall violate the public policy of this state 
and be void and unenforceable if the court, arbitration, 
tribunal, or administrative agency bases its rulings or 
decisions in the matter at issue in whole or in part on foreign 
law that would not grant the parties affected by the ruling or 
decision the same fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges 
granted under the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions, 
including but not limited to due process, freedom of religion, 
speech, or press, and any right of privacy or marriage as 
specifically defined by the Constitution of this state. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 20 (West 2015). 
South Dakota 
No court, administrative agency, or other governmental 
agency may enforce any provisions of any religious code. 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (Supp. 2015). 
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Tennessee 
It is the public policy of this state that the primary factor 
which a court, administrative agency, arbitrator, mediator or 
other entity or person acting under the authority of state law 
shall consider in granting comity to a decision rendered under 
any foreign law, legal code or system against a natural person 
in this state is whether the decision rendered either violated or 
would violate any right of the natural person in this state 
guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution or the United States 
Constitution or any statute or decision under those 
constitutions. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-102 (Supp. 2015). 
